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New Standards 
for Historical Homicide Research 
Eric Monkkonen 
Les historiens de la violence disposent dorénavant de douzaines, voire de 
centaines, de taux d'homicides de bonne qualité pour la plus grande partie de 
l'hémisphère occidental. Nous nous trouvons donc dans une situation qui, 
conformément à l'usage, implique d'entreprendre synthèse et généralisation. 
Un effort de ce type est méritoire et doit être poursuivi, mais il est temps de 
revenir à une recherche empirique beaucoup plus soigneuse, et les avancées 
significatives réalisées jusqu'ici devraient nous inciter à rehausser encore la 
qualité de nos recherches. Pour le dire simplement: si des recherches plus 
sophistiquées confirmaient les travaux antérieurs, ce serait positif. Si 
inversement, elles modifiaient nos résultats, nous devrions leur faire bonne 
figure et repenser nos grandes questions et nos analyses en conséquence. 
Historians of violence now have dozens, even hundreds, of high quality 
homicide rates for much of the Western world. We are now in a position which 
would, by custom, demand the beginning of synthesis and generalization. 
Such efforts are of merit and should continue, but it is time that we turn back 
to much more careful empirical research. Our substantive gains should give 
us the confidence to raise even higher the quality of our research. Simply put, 
if refined research efforts confirm previous work, this is comforting. On the 
other hand, if they change or modify findings, we should welcome the new 
results and rethink our big questions and analyses. 
The study of personal violence has come a long way in the years since Ted Gurr and Alfred Soman wrote their path breaking essays synthesizing large 
bodies of scholarly work; the best internal critique of the oeuvre thus far has been 
articulated by Spierenburg2. There are now hundreds of studies (over 300 according 
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to Eisner), rather than the dozen or so on which Gurr and Soman based their essays. 3 
Because of these studies, we now know that we can get a firm grasp on personal vio-
lence well into the past. There are now several fruitful theoretical ways to examine 
violence, from the civilizing process to classical Durkheimian sociology to evolu-
tionary psychology4. There is a growing international standard of definition and 
communication which makes cross national comparisons ordinary, rather than 
merely wished for: researchers now make explicit their definitions of what they 
include as homicide and regularly per capitize their results. 
This paper deals briefly with the empirical problems of this long term synthesis, 
and then focuses on what I believe should be new international research standards. 
The subject of violence is restricted here to mortal personal violence, homicide, and 
does not address other forms of violence which do not result in death. It makes no 
claims that homicide indexes other kinds of violence, but rather assumes that homi-
cide, in and of itself, is a significant enough aspect of violence to merit singular 
attention. The argument is simple: the time has come for new levels of quality in 
data gathering. Just as the beginnings of cross national and theoretically interesting 
analysis came from the discoveries made by high quality empirical research, the 
next step is to refine the data and then to refine the questions. 
I. 
In their syntheses, both Gurr and Soman juxtaposed disparate studies - studies 
characterized by focused, non comparative research efforts - to show a now famil-
iar picture reproduced in Figure 1: the decline from very high rates of personal vio-
lence in the middle ages to relatively low rates by the late nineteenth century, at least 
in Europe. It is important to remember how startling these results were as they 
refuted scholarly wisdom and theory, the romantic notion of a peaceful communal 
past overcome by the violence of urban industrial order. This change in understand-
ing, while now thorough in the community which studies crime, has probably still 
not penetrated conventional wisdom, even though a highly visible article on the syn-
thesis appeared in Past & Present5. 
Since the 1980s, continuing research on levels of personal violence appears to 
buttress the Gurr/Soman synthesis. Most recently Ylikangas has summarized a large 
number of studies of Nordic countries, adding many new places to the list6. A 
summary graph of these new studies still resembles the Gurr graph, with the virtue 
of many new data points. Ylikangas' thorough review of these studies suggests that 
the long turn decline is a robust empirical finding, and he argues that the Elias thesis 
applies across many more places than just the core European nations. 
Should we conclude that the empirical question is now settled? That « violent 
past, peaceful present» describes our world? Should we move on to other ques-
tions ? I believe not, for several reasons. 
3
 Eisner (2001). 
4
 Spierenburg (1996), Thome (2001); Daly, Wilson (1988). 
5
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6
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Figure 1: Gurr's original graph. Source: Gurr (1981). 
Spotty Knowledge 
First, consider the awkward problem of those places that we actually know 
about. Given the lack of knowledge about medieval and early modern populations, 
we do not really know how representative the study sites have been. We do not even 
know what proportion of a region's population has been studied. In an era when few 
people lived in cities, it may be necessary to study large rural areas or sets of vil-
lages. 
The cliche that it easy to lie with statistics needs a corollary: it is even easier to 
lie without statistics. Limited information is much better than none, but we should 
not stop with our current limits. The more studies we get, the better: a large sample 
will give us some confidence that the generalizations we have been accepting are 
reasonable. Since we may never have a good sense of the populations of the 
medieval and much of the early modern world, we may have to substitute many 
study sites with unknown biases for fewer and more representative study sites. The 
notion of adding piece by piece to knowledge truly applies to this research: it is a 
thousand piece puzzle, or series of puzzles, to which many projects contribute. 
Nevertheless, no matter how well done the individual studies, the data are very 
hard to interpret and we must confront this issue. The individual studies give us 
homicide rates for places which may vary enormously in size, and we do not know 
if a few small places distort the picture. If we suspect that a few small or large places 
do distort the overall picture, we may need to consider them separately, arguing, as 
it were, over tiny pieces in the larger puzzle. Consider the impact of the homicide 
count in Hammer's pioneering and justly well regarded study of Oxford7. Because 
the city was so small (approximately 6 000), two unusual years with high violence 
7
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could have easily produced the high rates. Two riots, say, with ten dead each, would 
be enough to account for the rates he found (this would yield 166 per hundred thou-
sand per year). If the city returned to a normal high rate of one death per year, the 
rate would then be 16 per hundred thousand: high but not the bizarre extreme 
Hammer discovered. It is odd that such a pioneering and important article has not 
generated follow up studies - say, the next decades or century in Oxford or a paral-
lel study of another university town. 
Note that many other important cities, for example Bergen in 1600, had popula-
tions as small as Oxford's. In the case of small study sites one must be more careful 
because the numerator of homicide counts can exert high power when converted to 
rates per hundred thousand. If, for instance, a city of 6 000 reported a death a year 
because the coroner or his equivalent met in that city but viewed the evidence from 
deaths in the surrounding region, one would have an apparent homicide rate of 16 
per hundred thousand. Similarly, if there was a feud in a city of 6 000, and for three 
years there was a single homicide a year, but then none for the subsequent twenty 
years, the rate should not be reported as 16,7 per hundred thousand for three years, 
but smoothed to 2,2 per hundred thousand (3 divided by 138 000 (that is, 6 000 times 
23 years) then multiplied by 100 000). Or, if a city's reported population excluded 
the non-resident sojourners, their size would have to be estimated. With small 
denominators, seemingly trivial differences can be converted into dramatic rate dif-
ferences. Extreme caution is in order. 
A similar critique may not apply to medieval London - its size precluding dis-
tortions caused by numerator error or size - but note that if for some unknown 
reason its rates have been overestimated, then the shape of the line in Figure 1, the 
basis for Gurr's original analysis, is not nearly so dramatic. 
To highlight the extraordinary potential for misunderstanding caused by the 
inadvertent selection of atypical study sites, consider the United States in 1996, 
about which we have very good data (see the Appendix). I use here FBI murder sta-
tistics on just those 188 cities with populations greater than 100 000. Even for these 
current data, it is important to note that some cities are not listed by this source due 
to reporting failures; we do not know what difference this might have made. Two of 
the highest murder rate cities were also among the smallest in size. San Antonio had 
the highest murder rate, 55,2, and a population of only 107 000, while third highest 
was Gary, Indiana (rate 35,1), with a population of 111 000. If we were delving into 
American violence from afar and had selected these two cities, both in the middle of 
the country, one in the north and one in the south, we would think violence very 
high, especially among smaller cities (if we knew enough to know that these were in 
fact smaller cities). We almost might think that the north and the south had similar 
homicide rates. Or, if we had compared 1996 Gary to 2000 San Antonio, we would 
think something else, for in the intervening 4 years San Antonio's rate had plum-
meted8. 
On the other hand, twelve of these 188 largest US cities had no murders, none. 
The chances are one in sixteen that a scholar could have selected one of these cities 
for a homicide study. If, for example, one had selected Piano, Texas, population of 
192 000 and no murders, one might have concluded wrongly that Texas was vio-
lence free. 
8
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Further, an unweighted average of these three example cities - Gary, San 
Antonio, and Piano - would give a very poor understanding of the whole, 30 homi-
cides per hundred thousand. The actual mean rate for all 188 cities was 8,8. The 
extremes pull up this mean, for only 43 of these 188 cities actually had murder rates 
at the average or higher. Fully half of the United States cities had rates of 4,4 or less. 
So, there is a fifty percent probability that one would select a study city with a homi-
cide rate half that of the national urban mean. The major lesson to take away is that 
a sample of cities can produce huge biases and that without full information, these 
cannot be known easily if at all. We have the ability to standardize to a population 
base of 100 000, to make the comparisons accurate, but the places may be highly dif-
ferent. 
One apparent solution to the problem of cross site comparison has been to look 
at trends in one place: again, the actual place may not capture the whole. In the 
United States, the much discussed decline in homicide rates from 1991 to the 
present occurred in 100 of these largest 188 cities, but homicide rates increased in 
81. 
Given this potentially devastating critique, and the remote likelihood that we 
will ever recreate past statistics with the coverage of those of the late twentieth 
century, should we give up? Of course not: but we should try to compensate, to 
examine with care each new case, and to ask scholars to produce some estimates of 
what they would guess that their sample means. For example, contextual informa-
tion might suggest that a place had a reputation for being violent or quiet; we could 
then asterisk such cases when plotting them. Or, we could weight reported city rates 
by a crude Big, Medium, or Small size category, based on a scholar's assessment of 
the study city's size relative to other cities in that region and era. Then, when pro-
ducing composite graphs like Gurr's, the plotted symbols of the largest cities could 
be made larger than those of the smallest ones. In this approach, little Oxford at 6 
000 persons would be a tiny speck when contrasted with London at 80 000. This 
would give the plot much more analytic power. We might also add to each new set 
of study sites a date of completion so that when plotted, one could see if newer 
studies support or contradict older ones as they get added in. 
II. 
The power of violence research, especially homicide research, is that deaths are 
usually reported, and that we can come to some core agreements about what we can 
count as a homicide. For example, infanticide and the murder of very young children 
has been treated so inconsistently and the cause of death so often poorly reported 
that most scholars exclude infanticide and the murder of young children from their 
counts: consistency, not ethical judgement, determines this choice9. One conse-
quence is a slight undercount in violence rates - in the late twentieth century United 
States, for example, victims under five years old account for two to three percent of 
all murders. 
Just as there is some agreement on what can be counted as a homicide, the con-
temporary practice of reporting deaths as a rate - per annum counts per hundred 
9
 For a critique of this practice, see Emmerichs (2000) and Nadel (2000). 
10 ERIC MONKKONEN 
thousand population base - is highly standardized. These two basic practices -
which derive from the growth of international vital statistics - have fostered the 
international and across time comparisons10. 
Missing Homicides 
However, even with agreement or definitional clarity as to what gets counted as 
a homicide, an obvious problem with the violent event count is the question of what 
has been missed. The possible missing events stem from three causes: 
One, damaged or misplaced records; 
Two, incomplete recording - from hidden homicides to sloppy record keeping; 
and 
Three, systematic biases - for example, a recording practice which mentions 
only crimes with known assailants (typically, trial based records). 
There is a very good and well established way of testing for observations omitted 
or unrecorded in the counts, known as «capture-recapture» or the Chandra-Sekar-
Deming method. The technique is used by animal researchers to count things like 
the number of fish in a lake and by demographers for estimating populations in 
places without regular censuses 1 1. The requirements for the technique lend them-
selves to historical homicide research: one needs two separate lists of unique iden-
tifiers, e.g., one list of victims from the coroner and another from a newspaper, or, 
perhaps, one list of offenders from jail registries and another from indictments. 
Given two lists, one can use capture-recapture sampling to estimate the number of 
events missed, that is the homicides mentioned in neither. The technique assumes 
that each sample or list is an independent random sample: this is most certainly not 
the case with historical homicide lists. The bias introduced by what are probably 
correlated, non independent lists, is a conservative one: thus the estimates of missed 
homicides is low. As most researchers prefer to err on the side of conservatism, this 
is an important side note, a consequence of working with historical documents as 
opposed to fish. An important paper by Douglas Eckberg on nineteenth century 
South Carolina homicides clearly explains the technique, which I follow here 1 2. 
Table One shows the results of several different re-estimates for two cities, New 
York and Los Angeles. These examples are based on my own recent archival work1 3. 
Note in the Table that for some years in the nineteenth century, my original New 
York estimates were relatively far off the mark, but that in general, the proportion of 
homicides missed was less than ten percent. This gives good confirmation that my 
original estimates were not wildly off. But on three occasions, the technique pro-
vides a powerful corrective: New York 1860 and 1863, and Los Angeles for 1909. 
Of these three, the New York correctives were already available in other sources, 
which had reported annual homicide counts. But, for Los Angeles, 1909, several 
months of coroner inquests's were missing, and without this sampling method, the 
year would have had to be omitted from any subsequent analysis. Thus, the tech-
nique can not only provide a strong corrective to known source problems, but it can 
also corroborate the original data. 
1 0
 See United States (1995) for the American part of the story of vital statistics. 
1 1
 Chenuil, Crespin, Pouyaud, Patrick, (2000); Sydeman, Nur, McLaren, McChesney, (1998). 
1 2
 Eckberg (1998); Monkkonen (2001b). 
1 3
 Monkkonen (2001b). 
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Table 1: Homicide counts & capture-recapture estimates (New York City) 
* In the original New York City research (Monkkonen, 2001a) the strategy had been to use the highest 
number of homicides, whether the number came from individual murders compiled from coroners's 
reports, newspaper and other sources or it came from an annual count mentioned in a public health 
or other published reports. For the capture-recapture analysis, with the exception of the first cell, a 
new list of individual names was gathered from newspaper sources alone and this list was then used 
against the list of names from the coroner's inquests. For the first cell, the comparison list was from 
a record of prison admissions (see Monkkonen, 2001b, for further details). In the second panel of this 
table, for Los Angeles, the sources were simpler: coroner's reports and newspaper articles. 
** N1 (Times index only) = 12 - N2 (Coroner's inquests only) = 2 1 - C (in both) = 35 - Estimation total 
= N l + N 2 + C + ( N l * N 2 ) / C - F o r 1865 = 1 2 + 2 1 + 3 5 + 7 . 2 = 7 5 . 2 
Table 1: (continued) Los Angeles City and County 
Recently, Howard Taylor has published a powerful argument that, under fiscal 
pressure to save money, nineteenth century English coroners deliberately under-
12 ERIC MONKKONEN 
counted homicides1 4. Rather than a dispute over what might or might not have hap-
pened, capture-recapture would provide a simple test of Taylor's thesis. Readily 
available newspapers and coroners records would provide the two lists required. Of 
course, a scholarly dispute without further evidence may prove more interesting, 
even if providing little new information. 
Denominator problems 
A problem parallel to the missed homicides in the numerator also exists in the 
denominator, the population estimates. It seems to be an historical law that places 
with good victim lists have poor base population counts. Most historians are grate-
ful to have even crude population estimates with which to per capitize their hard 
earned murders. Few would consider actually making better population counts as 
this would be an entirely different - and time consuming - research project. Yet, it 
is conceivable to deal with the problem of poor quality population counts with the 
same sampling method as for the violent event counts: demographers use capture -
recapture sampling principally to estimate populations in countries without cen-
suses, after all. One thinks for example, of the extraordinary high homicide rates that 
Hammer found for Oxford. This city cries out for more research: we may all accept 
the homicide counts, but why should we believe the population estimates ? Hammer 
carefully discusses and evaluates the various sources for his estimate: but we should 
note that this small population of 6 000 could well have been estimated on its per-
manent, rather than temporary population. 
Population age structure 
Should one get to the point of carefully estimated missingness for the numerator 
and denominator, there is a third and equally vexing challenge: the age and sex 
structure of the population at risk. We would expect to have few violent events in a 
society composed of women over sixty years old. Yet for the most part we happily 
create violence measures which assume that the population denominator is unprob-
lematic, that the same population proportions by age and gender are parallel across 
vast reaches of history and geography. Murders per 100 000 as a measure is such an 
advance over previous knowledge and such an achievement in itself, that we seldom 
ask what kind of population base we have employed. 
Surely, a new mining town filled with men between the ages of 20 and 40 is not 
the same as a retirement village where the average age is 60. Would we per capitize 
murder rates (if any) for these two sites without some careful thinking ? More to the 
point, for long term historical studies, is the substantially more youthful population 
of nineteenth century and early modern places: was the age structure of the middle 
ages a fundamental cause of high violence rates ? Does not our standard usage of 
population denominators mask something equally as basic ? Do we need to ask more 
questions about the population of fourteenth century Oxford? Was it composed pri-
marily of men exactly in the years most at risk for violence ? If so, the extraordinary 
rates should be reduced to 20% or 30% of those reported, placing them at a still high 
but not wild level of 25 per hundred thousand and leaving London as the highest 
point on Gurr's graph. 
1 4
 Taylor (1998a, 1998b). 
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Consider two example cities: Turin in 1705 and New York in 1850. The mean 
age for men in both cities is similar, 24 in New York and 27 in Turin. (The sex 
balance for both is similar: 49% men in Turin, 50,5 % in New York.) This informa-
tion alone does not tell us much. However, the actual age distribution tells us a great 
deal. Figure 2 plots the distribution by age of males in these two cities. We see that 
New York has a bulge of men in the age group 18 to 35, just the age at which we 
expect to see more criminal violence. One can only guess at what a plot for four-
teenth century London or Oxford would look like. 
Figure 2: Male age distributions, New York (1850) and Turin (1705). 
Source: Symcox and Monkkonen (1994). 
Fortunately, there is a well established method for correcting for dissimilar pop-
ulation numerators, known as age standardizing. The research reported on here rep-
resents an initial set of age standardized homicide rates. It serves as a cautionary 
tale, and I hope also demonstrates the costs and benefits of even more careful 
research standards. Age standardization is relatively simple computationally, requir-
ing a systematic attention to detail which should conform well with normal histori-
cal research practices. To do the analysis, one must have the age distribution of the 
original population and of the homicide victims or offenders. Clearly, the age of the 
offenders is the more important measure, but typically the age of the victim is much 
more thoroughly reported15. The ages of victims and offenders are usually only 
loosely correlated, but the distributions are close to one another. (In the 1700 indi-
vidual pre 1875 New York City homicides analyzed in Monkkonen (2001a), the 
mean age of 379 offenders was 30,1 years and of 783 victims over five was 31,8. 
The correlation of the two, for men alone, was r = .36.) Standard age categories are 
less than 1 year old, 1-4,5-14,15-24,25-34,35-44,55-64,65-64,75 and up 1 6 . In the 
1 5
 See Monkkonen (1999) for a discussion of nineteenth century offender age data. 
1 6
 See Anderson and Rosenberg for a discussion of the new standards (1998, p. 13). 
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analysis which follows, I have not corrected for sex, only age, in part because sex 
balance was similar for all of my comparison cities. All rate distributions are recal-
culated to make the comparison population the whole United States in 2000: note 
that the actual base population is arbitrary - only consistency is required17. 
Table Two displays the adjustments in per capita homicide rates for six different 
cities. It should be noted at the outset that most of these cities, with the exception of 
1830 New York, have good quality census population data and that the homicide 
counts come from an era beginning to emphasize the systematic collection of vital 
statistics. Arguably, the cities share important characteristics affecting violence: all 
were undergoing rapid immigration and population growth, all had booming 
economies and great inequality18. One would not have expected dramatic differ-
ences for the cities shown here. Yet for three, the age standardized differences are 
substantial, with the most dramatic change for 1830 New York, an 85% increase. All 
of the other cities show a decrease in the rates when age standardized, the decrease 
ranging from a modest 5% to a large 32%. 
These new calculations reverse the rank order for the first two cities, New York 
and Liverpool1 9. The rates for Los Angeles remain the highest in the group: when 
the Los Angeles rate is inflated to account for the 25% found missing by capture-
recapture, the city had the very high rate of 19 per hundred thousand. 
Table 2: Original and age standardized homicide rates: rank ordered. 
* Los Angeles based on homicides 1895-1904; Liverpool based on 1852-1865 ; New York City based 
on 1825-1834; San Francisco based on two fiscal years, 1879-1880,1880-1881. Note that San Francisco 
may have excluded Chinese. Source: see text. 
Figures 3 and 4 plot New York City homicide rates over a nearly two century 
span to illustrate the effects of that city's changing age structure. Figure 3 shows the 
period 1820 to 1960 in order to examine the era of low homicide rates, while Figure 
4 shows the whole long span. The broken line is for the age standardized rates: the 
solid line shows the conventional rates per hundred thousand. 
1 7
 The actual re-estimates are done in Stata using the direct age standardization program (StataCorp, 
1999). 
1 8
 See Gallman (2000) for an excellent summary of Liverpool's social situation. 
1 9
 Note that these examples have not been verified using capture recapture. 
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Figure 3: New York City homicides per 100,000 (solid line) and age standardized rates (bro-
ken line), 1820-1960. Source: see text. 
Figure 4: New York City homicides per 100,000 (solid line) and age standardized rates (bro-
ken line), 1820-1990. Source: see text. 
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In both figures it is clear that age has made a difference even in this single city, 
sometimes dampening violence peaks and at others inflating them. All of the 
sharpest peak years - 1860, 1930, 1980, and 1990 - are moderated by age standard-
ization. The lowest year, 1830, is raised. These corrections are only on the decade, 
so one presumes that other peaks and valleys would be similarly modified were age 
distributions available on an annual basis. The violent mid nineteenth and late twen-
tieth centuries are still violent, but the contrasts are moderated. The effect is as 
though a string had been drawn through the plot and pulled tight, smoothing the 
peaks and filling the valleys. Although visually moderate, several inter- decadal 
trends are changed, even reversed. For instance, the period 1820 to 1830 saw an 
increase, not a decrease, 1910-1920 saw an increasing instead of stable trend, and 
1940-1950 saw an increase, not stability. 
An additional limitation to age standardization is that when one is estimating 
population, often the age distribution is unavailable. In both Table 2 and Figures 3 
and 4, the data are reported on the decade because this is when the census enumera-
tion occurred. Interpolating on an annual basis might be satisfactory for the cruder 
counts per hundred thousand denominator, but will not be satisfactory with age 
grouping. Accounting for immigration is simply too difficult. So, the gain in decadal 
quality is offset by the loss in the interesting annual fluctuations. For the pre 1880 
years, I have used a ten year span of victims' ages, centered on the decade: this 
avoids the distortion problem caused by small numbers. The best research strategy 
may therefore be to establish the best counts possible and do spot estimations of 
both missing data and the age standardized rate. This will not be the same as the best 
possible set of corrected annual rates, but it will be a good sign of whether or not age 
and missing events have skewed the analysis. 
Changing medical practice, better weapons 
Violence scholars often puzzle over the question, «What would have happened 
with today's medical care ?» Looking at long term violence rates, this is the question 
raised by almost all non historians about the data. Few have tried to deal systemati-
cally with this, and the usual solution is to hope that today's improved medical care 
is offset equally by improved weapons 2 0. Should we think so? Not answering this 
question implies that it is impossible to assess. Certainly we may never have - either 
for today or the distant past - exactly the information we need: this would include 
both fatal as well as non fatal assaults, the type of injury and the progress of the 
injuries either to death or to recovery, and the kind and effect of the medical inter-
ventions. However, we often can get information on the injuries leading to death, in 
particular the kind of weapon, and on the elapsed time from injury to death. This 
basic information offers the possibility of many insights. 
For the twentieth century, both the time from injury to medical care and the 
changes in medical care itself have reduced mortality from injury. For American 
combat injuries in World War I, the modal time from injury to treatment was 12-18 
hours, with a mortality rate of 8,5%: the time dropped to 6-12 hours in World War 
II, and mortality dropped to 5,8%. During the Korean conflict, often cited as an era 
2 0
 Lane (1979, pp. 78-80) may have been the first historian to bring this question explicitly in view. See 
also Spierenburg (1996 at note 78). 
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of major advances in trauma care, treatment occurred between 2 and 4 hours, with a 
dramatically improved mortality rate of 2,4% 2 1. 
Figure 5 shows the estimated time from assault to death for a hundred and fifty 
mid nineteenth century New York City homicide victims 2 2. The hours expressed are 
maximums: that is, someone dying instantly I coded as one hour, whereas an 
ambiguously noted time might be a maximum of twenty four hours and possible as 
low as twelve. Missing cases simply had hopelessly ambiguous notations - « died 
yesterday» or «died shortly thereafter» - or were reconstructed from a sketchily 
reported criminal trial with no information about the conflict itself. 
Figure 5: Time from assault to death for those dying within three days (72% of all victims), 
nineteenth century New York City. Source: Monkkonen (2000a). 
These data allow the big question, «How would contemporary medical inter-
vention have affected murder rates ?» to be addressed, if with huge qualifications. 
One can see in the picture the onset of infections, and the consequences of blood loss 
which occurred in three or so days after the assault. Doctors familiar with violent 
assaults think that many of the post twenty four hour deaths could have been pre-
vented with today's medicine, whereas the deaths occurring in less than one hour 
(often called the «Golden Hour») were probably not preventible. The third group, 
deaths one to six hours after assault, those now treated in trauma rooms, have a pos-
2 1
 American College of Surgeons (1990, p. 9). 
2 2
 For the years 1857, 1859-1861 there were 277 homicide victims, for 214 of whom I was able to get 
a good time to death estimate. 
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sible 50% save rate23. By this standard, about fifty percent of the mid nineteenth 
century New York City homicide deaths would have been preventable had the 
assaults occurred in a modern city (all 24% of those who died in two hours or less; 
2%, half of the group who died in 3-6 hours; plus 24%, one third of the group who 
died after 6 hours). 
What about the second half of the then versus now question: improved modern 
weapons ? Figure 6 separates the time to death by major weapons. In the figure, 
«other» weapons include everything from drowning and defenestration to mainly 
blows with feet, hands, and sticks. 
Figure 6: Time to death by weapon, New York City, nineteenth century. The median time is 
24 hours for guns, 48 for bladed weapons and 18 for other weapons. (Cases with 
time to death ranging for three weeks to four months have been dropped for visual 
clarity.) N=32 for guns, 78 for blade, 101 other and 211 for total. Source, see text. 
The differences by weapon are instructive. For guns, the initial burst of deaths 
probably came from bleeding, with the second group - after two days from injury -
from infection24. 
Bladed weapons must have caused a large proportion (50%) of deaths due to 
internal bleeding and infection: inquests occasionally mention peritonitis. Half of 
all knife deaths came after two days, while half of all gun deaths came within a day. 
The « other » category has a slightly quicker time to death: the initial large group 
of deaths probably coming from brain injury and internal hemorrhaging, with sec-
ondary infections accounting for the long trailing out of post injury deaths shown in 
the lower left panel of Figure 6. Does this initial burst of quick death reflect the 
2 3
 Drs. Eisenmann and Lambe, assisted my analysis of these data. 
2 4
 Wilson, Walt (1996, p. 859). 
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greater determination of the assailant? The scenario of stab wounds was often that 
the victim fled or offender departed after one or two thrusts, while fights involving 
blows, sticks and rocks sometimes continued until one person died. 
Today, handguns account for about 75% of all murders in New York City, so if 
we triple the weapon proportion of nineteenth century murders and save the lives of 
all those surviving at least 24 hours, there would be approximately a 50% reduction 
in deaths. On the other hand, in a world where all involved in violent confrontations 
were accustomed to a leisurely conclusion to bloody conflict, who is to say that 
assailants might not have turned to surer forms of assault - sticks and stones, say ? 
That is, if violent men (93% of all offenders in this sample were men) knew that 
medical intervention could thwart their attacks, might they have followed through 
more decisively, more often ? 
In the 21 s t century, we imagine murder to be sudden and decisive. Not so in the 
nineteenth century. In a large number of murders, after inflicting an injury, the 
offender was taken to jail «to await the results of the injuries.» Or, many news 
stories titled «Fatal Affray» concluded, often erroneously, that the victim «surely 
will die.» These phrases, so very common, suggest that in the pre electronic age, 
nothing happened that fast, whether a shipwreck or a homicidal confrontation. Ante 
mortem depositions were very common: part of a fatal confrontation was the time 
afterwards, when all - medical personnel, friends and relatives of victim and 
offender, the coroners and juries, police, and offender - just waited. The well known 
1869 murder of Albert Richardson, a prominent journalist, by Daniel McFarland, is 
instructive25. McFarland had previously attempted to shoot Richardson but had 
failed. The second time he fired from a distance of three feet, in public, in the outer 
office of Richardson's newspaper. Richardson then lingered in a room at the best 
hotel - the Astor House - for almost two weeks, while various treatments - «injec-
tions» of milk, beef tea, brandy and a «fine spray of rum» on the face (for fever) -
were administered. Though the whole story of the stalking and assaults reeks of 
McFarland's ineptitude and delay, he succeeded. One presumes that had there been 
swifter and surer medical attention, McFarland would have compensated with a 
swifter and surer attack. So, if we imagine that modern medicine would have saved 
poor Richardson, we would also have to imagine a different attack as well. A third 
attack, perhaps, or a more vicious first one. 
None of the examples fully developed in this paper show a shocking reassess-
ment in violence rates. None suggest that the proposed refinements will erase the 
familiar picture of high medieval homicides. This may be in part because all of the 
examples are from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. If in the future scholars do 
similar readjustments and test missing information and come up with similar robust-
ness for medieval and early modern rates, that is all to the good. But, until we have 
used these higher standards, we must be cautious in the long run and wide ranging 
comparisons which have become an important part of the field of violence studies. 
It is probable that capture-recapture will yield more homicides but that the age 
adjusting will lower the rates. But, this should not be a topic for guessing. In addi-
tion, the very small size of many study sites should come in for special scrutiny: a 
more predictable pattern will be of great unevenness over time and space, while 
introducing the years and places with no homicides will lower the reported rates 
2 5
 Cooper (1993). 
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considerably. We may discover that medieval and early modern rates were more in 
the range 5 to 15 per hundred thousand. 
A finding of more erratic and unpredictable rates of personal violence, rather 
than consistently high rates, actually fits current theory quite well. Whether from the 
point of view of Durkheim or Elias, a slow rise in predictable and stable human 
interactions, in city and country, is exactly what we should find. This leaves the 
decline in violence hypothesis moderated yet still intact and built on a sounder basis. 
The hypothesis is far too important to stand untested and unrefined, as it now does. 
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Appendix: Homicide rates in U.S. cities >100 000 population, 1996 
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